




The Extreme Negative Portrayal of the Serb “Minority” 
in Albanian-language Newspapers in Kosovo
Abstract: Through perpetuating negative stereotypes and rigid dichotomous identities, 
the media play a significant part in sustaining conflict dynamics in Kosovo. Examin-
ing their discourse in terms of ideological production and representations is crucial in 
order to understand the power relations between the majority and the minority, the 
identity politics involved in sustaining them, and the intractability of the conflict. In 
an effort to provide a deeper understanding of the intractable conflict in Kosovo, and 
the role of the media in protracting it, this study uses critical discourse analysis to ex-
amine articles related to issues affecting the Serb community, published in Albanian-
language print media. The master narrative that comes out of the analysis is that of 
“threat” —  the threat that Kosovo Albanians continue to face from Serbs and Serbia; 
a threat that is portrayed as historical and constant. The discourse further strengthens 
the conflict dynamics of opposition, polarization and even hatred. This master nar-
rative implies that Serbs are enemies, to be feared, contested, fought against; conflict 
is thus the normal state of affairs. The study also looks at the implications of media 
discourse for reconciliation efforts and the prospects of the Serb minority in Kosovo 
society, arguing that when the Other is presented as dangerous and threatening, fear 
of the Other and a desire to eliminate the threat, physically and symbolically, become 
perceived as a “natural” response, and thus constitute a significant conflict-sustaining 
dynamic. 
Keywords: Serbs, Serbia, Kosovo, Albanian media, critical discourse analysis, power re-
lations, discrimination, master narrative, intractable conflict
Following the power shift in Kosovo in June 1999, the Albanian popu-lation, which had been the demographic majority in the province up 
until then but without political and governing power throughout the 1990s, 
gained control and political power and became the ruling majority, while the 
Serb population lost power and was physically and symbolically excluded 
from Kosovo society, forced into displacement, and became the subjugated 
and marginalized minority. 
As the struggle for power between two dominant groups formed the 
crux of the conflict, this profound change in power relations, between ma-
jority and minority, remains one of the most essential dynamics sustaining 
this conflict. The situation, which is sometimes termed “post-conflict”, be-
cause of a formal lack of organized, overt and violent expressions of conflict, 
still exemplifies characteristics of protracted and intractable conflict.
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in Kosovo. Thus, examining their discourse in terms of ideological produc-
tion and representations is crucial in order to understand the power rela-
tions between the majority and the minority, the identity politics involved 
in sustaining them, and the intractability of the conflict.
Kosovo Albanian politicians are often heard proclaiming that Koso-
vo is not a second Albanian state in the Balkans, but a multi-ethnic society, 
where minority rights are respected, and where the Serb minority is free, 
even encouraged to integrate. However, they either ignore the mass-scale 
segregation of the Serb community, the general societal antagonism toward 
the minority, the poor human rights record and appalling living conditions, 
or attribute it to self-isolation, the negative influence of the Serbian central 
government in Belgrade, and the refusal of the Kosovo Serbs to accept what 
is often labelled “the new reality,” which implies the unilateral declaration of 
independence in February 2008 that changed power relations in deeply di-
vided Kosovo society. Hence, Kosovo society remains segregated, polarized, 
and the same dynamics that fuelled the 1998–99 conflict and post-conflict 
expulsions of Serbs and other non-Albanians are present. 
In an effort to provide a deeper understanding of the intractable in-
terethnic conflict in Kosovo, and the role of the media in protracting it, this 
study uses critical discourse analysis to examine articles related to issues af-
fecting the Serb community, published in Albanian-language print media. 
The Kosovo conflicT and issues of idenTiTy
The conflict between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo has been portrayed, 
and understood locally, as traditional, inevitable, natural and irreconcilable. 
Yet, even though the conflict between these two groups has a lengthy tradi-
tion, some would say dating back several centuries, it is imperative to stress 
that primordial hatred and “genetic” predispositions toward aggression are 
not the causes of the conflict.1 Folger, Stutman and Poole (2002, 3) remind 
us that intolerance and aggression surface, become accentuated and per-
petuated once the conflict starts, contributing to its persistence, intensity 
and violence, while the underlying causes are more complex, involving eco-
nomic, political and symbolic interests and issues. 
Nevertheless, the interethnic conflict in Kosovo can indeed be con-
sidered deep-rooted (Burton 1987), protracted (Azar 1983; Azar 1990) and 
1 See e.g. D. T.  Bataković 1992, 1998, 2006 and 2008; I. Berisha 1993; D. Bogdanović 
1985; A. N. Dragnich & S. Todorovich 1984; T. Judah 2000; H. Kaleshi 1973; R. Kap-
lan 1993; O. Karabeg 2000; M. Krasniqi 1996; B. Krstić 1994, 2004; A. Logoreci 1984; 
N. Malcolm 1998; S. Maliqi 1998; J. Pettifer 2001; P. Shoup 1984; S. Skendi 1967; M. 
Vickers 1998.
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intractable (Bar-Tal 1998; Coleman 2003; Ellis 2006) because it involves 
highly polarized groups who view themselves as oppressed and victimized, 
while seeing the Other as the exclusive and absolute cause of their op-
pression and victimization, and because it has persisted over generations 
as particularly resistant to resolution. The relationship between the Serbs 
and Albanians has five typical features of intractable conflict, namely pow-
er shifts and imbalances, identity processes (Coleman 2003) wherein the 
Other is constructed as the villain and the enemy — the historical enemy 
(Zdravković 2005), forced interdependence, extreme emotional processes, 
and everyday trauma and victimization. 
Ethnic conflicts are not only about material resources, but involve 
profound identity issues, wherein each group constitutes its own identity 
in relation, difference and opposition to the Other. The process of crafting 
ethnic identities that would appear constant and immutable necessitates the 
internalization, naturalization and stabilization of difference from the Other 
as an oppositional anchor (Ellis 1999). Kelman (1999) terms this “negative 
identity”, wherein the conflictual relationship with the “Other” is incorpo-
rated into the groups’ respective identities. He explains (p. 558.) that 
The exclusiveness of each group’s national identity is embedded in a pattern 
of negative interdependence of the two identities […]. This negative interde-
pendence of the two identities is further exacerbated by the fact that each 
side perceives the other as a source of its own negative identity elements.
Constituting one’s identity as a Serb or Albanian thus implies not 
only asserting difference from the Other, but also complete and absolute 
opposition. These identity dynamics are a crucial part of intractable conflict; 
they are least amenable to negotiation, resolution and transformation, as 
they are continuously reinforced and strengthened, through public and ver-
nacular discursive practices. In such a way ethnic conflicts become perceived 
as revolving around incompatible identity issues, and feelings of being en-
dangered — both symbolically and physically. 
The dialectics of opposition are accompanied by other forms of in-
terdependence, such as geographical, cultural, and economic. Even though 
they profoundly dislike each other, the Serbs and the Albanians have no 
opportunity to extract themselves from the mutual relationship. Due to the 
fact of living on the same land and claiming the same territory, their lives 
are inextricably intertwined. 
In spite of this forceful inter-reliance, the relationship in question is 
characterized by lack of contact between the groups; the resultant stereo-
types and misinformation not only lead to a negative view of the Other, but 
also to intense negative emotions — self-righteousness, rage, indignation, 
and most notably victimization. Both Serbs and Albanians carry a myriad 
of negative and extreme emotions linked to the Other, which are a powerful 
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impediment to resolution — the Other is often viewed as less than human, 
and thus groups continue a pattern of aggression and defensiveness.
Violence and aggression perpetrated by members of one’s own group 
are justified as a legitimate response to injustice, discrimination and humili-
ation by the Other and thus the cycle of revenge and counter-revenge per-
petuates itself, leading not only to severe and enduring psychological trauma, 
but inevitably to inter-generational trauma, chronic health problems and a 
reduced living capacity (Bar-Tal 1998). The conflict and the hostile rela-
tionship with the Other become embedded in the ordinary discourse and 
lifestyle of the people. The everyday trauma is translated into a victim iden-
tity, which is subsequently given historical proportions (Zdravković-Zonta 
2009); this in turn serves as a justification for all misdeeds, and also serves 
to posit the conflict in fixed binary oppositions of absolute victim versus 
absolute villain (Hawes 2004). The conceptualization of the conflict as a 
continuous struggle against oppression by the Other sustains and perpetu-
ates it, making it indeed intractable and impervious to resolution (Bataković 
1998; Mertus 1999). 
The siTuaTion in Kosovo: a shorT overview
Because of its lengthy and protracted nature it is difficult to pinpoint the 
start of the Serb-Albanian conflict in Kosovo. Furthermore, because of the 
vastly divergent versions of history that each group holds to be the Truth, 
it is difficult to present a unified overview of the situation. Nevertheless, 
the most recent episode in the conflict can be said to have started in 1990 
when, after years filled with tension and mutual accusations of discrimina-
tion between the Serbs and Albanians, the then-president of Serbia, Slobo-
dan Milošević, altered the constitutional status of the two provinces within 
Serbia — Vojvodina and Kosovo, curtailing their autonomy. This was the 
turning point, when the statistical minority, the Serbs, became the ruling 
majority in Kosovo.2 Many new laws were passed, which provided the basis 
2 Census statistics are not very reliable, and both Serbs and Albanian politicians and 
scholars have used vastly different numbers to support their divergent claims and accuse 
the other of manipulation. In 1981 the Kosovo Albanians participated in the last census; 
the total population of the province was given as 1.58 million, of whom 1.22 million or 
77.4 % were Albanians and 236,526 or 14.9 % were Serbs and Montenegrins. In 1991 
the Albanians boycotted the census, and their numbers were thus estimated as being 1.6 
million or 82.2 % of a total population of 1.97 million, of whom 215,346 or 10.9 % were 
Serbs and Montenegrins. Albanians disagree and claim that the number was higher, 
while some competent Serbian experts (e.g. M. Radovanović) claim it was significantly 
lower, 1.35 million due to high emigration in the 1980s. Statistics from tables of Census 
Data, 1948–1991 from Mertus 1999; and also in Judah 2002. Original source: Jugo-
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for discrimination3 against Albanians, who were excluded from the public 
sector, civil service and managerial jobs. 
In July 1990, Kosovo Albanians declared Kosovo a republic, indepen-
dent from Serbia but still part of Yugoslavia; they created a whole simulated 
government structure, holding elections for parliament and president.4 In 
September 1991 Kosovo Albanians, disregarding Serbs and non-Albanian 
population of the southern province of Serbia, declared the completely in-
dependent ‘Republic of Kosova’ with Ibrahim Rugova as president, rejected 
by EU and recognized only by Albania (Vickers 1998). New Albanian par-
allel institutions were set up in Kosovo to make up for the effective loss of 
health care and educational facilities.5 
After several years of following the ‘passive resistance’ policy without 
any success in terms of international recognition, the Kosovo Liberation 
Army (KLA), comprising solely ethnic Albanians, started armed resistance. 
Supported by funds from the Kosovo Albanian Diaspora ( Judah 2000), 
with training camps in neighbouring Albania, the Albanian guerrilla (KLA) 
was operational by 1996; yet, they intensified significantly their operations 
in 1997, and open armed conflict with the Serb police forces, accompanied 
by numerous crimes against both Albanian and Serbian civilian population, 
started.
As tens of thousands of Albanian civilians became displaced due 
to the confrontation between Serb and Kosovo Albanian forces, Western 
slavija 1918–1988, statistički godišnjak Jugoslavije za 1992. godinu (1992), 62–63, cited in 
Vučković and Nikolić 1996, 108–109. According to the 2008 estimate of the Statistical 
Office of Kosovo the number of habitual residents in Kosovo is 2.1 million, of which 
92% are Albanians, while other ethnic groups make up 8%. See http://www.ks-gov.
net/ESK/eng/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=36&Itemid=26 (last 
accessed on January 20, 2010). 
3 In response to Albanian separatism, the police force was rapidly purged, making it in 
essence a Serb-controlled force with other ethnic groups, including some local Albani-
ans, represented. Public companies which had operated under the aegis of the provin-
cial government were taken over by their Serbian counterparts. Doctors and medical 
staff of Albanian descent, still boycotting the new Serbian constitution, were dismissed. 
Cultural institutions were closed or merged with their Serbian counterparts, while the 
most dramatic application of the new measures came in the field of education – the Ser-
bian curriculum was imposed on Albanian students, and Albanian teachers rejected this 
measure, which led to dismissals, as well as the restrictions of the number of children 
who could be taught in Albanian language. See Judah 2000.
4 The Serbian authorities did not try to arrest the organizers, so that Albanians were left 
to hold their election. For more detail see Judah 2000.
5 Albanians organized a parallel education system, and set up schools in private homes. 
The students were taught in Albanian language, and their diplomas had the seal of the 
‘Independent Republic of Kosovo’. See Kostovicova 1997 and 2002.
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opinion began to change from viewing the situation in Kosovo as an inter-
nal issue, to perceiving it as a case where intervention was necessary.6 The 
use of force against Serbia emerged as a possible solution to the problem.7 
The international community set up status talks in Rambouillet, France in 
February 1999; after intense and prolonged negotiations the Kosovo Al-
banian delegation signed the draft agreement, as their demand for a refer-
endum for independence was worded in, while the Serbian delegation did 
not sign, because the agreement authorized a de facto occupation by NATO 
troops of the whole of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (consisting of Serbia 
and Montenegro).8
Subsequently, NATO started severe bombing of Serbia, without a le-
gal endorsement of UN Security Council, on March 24, 1999; the NATO 
bombing lasted 78 days.9 Serbia capitulated on June 3, and NATO suspend-
ed the bombing on June 10.10 The UN Security Council passed Resolution 
1244, which sanctioned the entry of NATO-led troops into Kosovo (KFOR), 
and set up the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) as 
the governing body,11 promising “substantial autonomy” for the UN-admin-
istered province, while guaranteeing sovereignty of the FR Yugoslavia.12 
6 After intense military threats by NATO, in October of 1998, Milošević agreed to a 
ceasefire. The Serbian military and police began to withdraw, while two thousand moni-
tors came to Kosovo under the auspices of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission. 
The displaced began coming down from the hills and moved into shelter for the winter. 
However, as the Serb forces pulled back, the KLA followed in their wake, reoccupying 
positions. The confrontations between the Albanian KLA and the Serbian forces thus 
continued, as well as the effect on civilians. See Judah 2000. 
7 For examination of the discourse of the Clinton Administration and US Congress 
over US policy toward the crisis in Kosovo, see Paris 2002.
8 Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, 23 February 1999. Ap-
pendix B: Status of Multi-National Military Implementation Force; see also Chomsky 
2000; Cohen 2000; Gowan 1999; Johnstone 2002.
9 The bombing of Serbia was intense, as more than 60% of its targets were what is called 
dual use, that is to say they had both military and civilian uses, including factories, oil 
refineries and depots, roads, bridges, railways, electricity and communication facilities.
10 For an account of the NATO bombings, see also Ignatieff 2002; Daalder & O’Hanlon 
2001; Chesterman 2002. Parenti 2002.
11 Its role was to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people 
of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
and which will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing 
the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure condi-
tions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo (UNMIK press release, 
21 September 1999).
12 However, one of the tasks of UNMIK was to organize, before ‘a final settlement’, 
elections to ‘provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government, 
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During the bombing, as claimed by the NATO sources almost 850,000 
Kosovo Albanians became refugees in Montenegro, Macedonia and Alba-
nia13 or were internally displaced in Kosovo.14 Within days of the cessa-
tion of the bombing, after the entry of NATO troops into Kosovo (KFOR) 
and the withdrawal of the Serbian forces, the refugees came streaming 
back.15 KLA leaders took control of the province and formed a government, 
which was later integrated with UNMIK into a Joint Interim Administra-
tive Structure.16 Simultaneously, a campaign of systematic prosecution and 
violence, as well as massive usurpation of properties (Tawil 2009), forced 
nearly 250,000 of Kosovo Serbs and non-Albanians to become internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) in Serbia and Montenegro,17 or to move into eth-
nically homogeneous enclaves within Kosovo and become internal IDPs 
(IIDPs).18 According to UNHCR data from December 1999, since June 
pending a political settlement’. Despite the fact that  the 1244 UNSC Resolution 
guaranteed that Kosovo was part of Yugoslavia, Kosovo was given almost all attributes 
of statehood under UNMIK administration (such as borders, customs, new currency, 
travel documents and id cards); for all intents and purposes Kosovo was run as an entity 
almost completely independent of Serbia, with de facto, but not de jure, independence.
13 For a critical perspective on the NATO bombing, see Chomsky 2000.
14 See UNHCR, Refugees, vol. 3, no. 116 (1999), 11.
15 According to UNHCR, 808,913 out of a total of 848,100 were back.
16 The Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) had legislative and ex-
ecutive authority in Kosovo. Over the years, UNMIK gradually transferred its compe-
tencies and authorities to local Kosovo institutions, called Provisional Institutions of 
Self-Government (PISG), until the February 2008 declaration of independence and 
the promulgation of the Kosovo Constitution in June of 2008. UNMIK is still present, 
but is no longer the administering civil authority, its scope limited to monitoring. Fol-
lowing the promulgation of the constitution, other internationally-sponsored mecha-
nisms were set up in Kosovo, such as the International Civilian Office (ICO) and its 
representative, and the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX). KFOR is still present, in 
order to maintain security, but is gradually decreasing its numbers.
17 By November 1999, the Yugoslav Red Cross had registered some 247,391 people, 
mostly Serbs and Roma, but not only, as displaced. See UNHCR/OSCE, “Overview 
of the situation of ethnic minorities in Kosovo”, 3 November 1999. During the March 
2004 riots another 4,100 persons, mostly Serbs, Roma and Ashkali, were forcibly dis-
placed. See Human Rights Watch (2004), July 2004, vol. 16, no. 6, Failure to Pro-
tect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo, March 2004. Available at http://hrw.org/re-
ports/2004/kosovo0704/index.htm, last accessed November 20, 2009; see also Amnesty 
International 2000.
18 Only a handful of Serbs remained in big urban and previously thriving multiethnic 
centres with dozens of thousands of Serb inhabitants such as Prizren, Peć, and Priština; 
they had to be guarded by KFOR troops and on rare occasions when they ventured out, 
had to be escorted. IDPs from the Prizren area joined Serbs who remained in Štrpce. In 
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1999 246,000 persons (at least 205,000 Serbs, as well as additional 45,000 
Roma, Montenegrins and Gorani) were expelled by the Albanian extrem-
ists into central Serbia and Montenegro. Today, out of the pre-1999 war 
non-Albanian population in Kosovo, roughly 60% of Kosovo Serbs, 66% 
of Kosovo Roma and 70 % of Gorani are living as displaced persons in 
central Serbia, with a symbolic return rate below 2% in twelve post-1999 
war years.19  
KFOR troops, deployed to ensure peace and security, understood 
their mission as being solely to protect Kosovo Albanians, and thus 
in the beginning did little or nothing to prevent the violence against 
the Serbs,20 which was tolerated as justifiable revenge. More than 150 
Serb Orthodox churches, including medieval ones were burned and de-
stroyed.21 Several hundred Serbs were killed in the months immediately 
following the entry of NATO troops in Kosovo,22 and more than 1,300 
were kidnapped.23 In the enclaves and in the receding urban ghettos, 
the Serbs soon had to be guarded by KFOR troops, had limited freedom 
of movement and no access to public services.24 In December 1999, the 
Gnjilane and Orahovac small Serb-inhabited ghettos were formed, while Velika Hoča 
became an enclave. Gračanica and the surrounding villages also became enclaves. The 
Ibar River became a dividing line between the Serbs in the northern part of Mitrovica, 
and the Albanians in the southern part previously cleansed of Serbs. See Amnesty In-
ternational, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Kosovo): Update from the field, January 
2000, at https://amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR70/002/2000/en/07344afe-dfcd-
11dd-8e17-69926d493233/eur700022000en.pdf (last accessed November 20, 2009).
19 For more detail, see Bataković 2006, 2007a, 2007b, and 2008.
20 Amnesty International, Kosovo: KFOR must act now to curb violence against ethnic 
minorities, 13 January 2000.
21 More on destruction of Serbian churches in Kosovo in Crucified Kosovo 1999.
22 Albanians were being killed too during this time; some were branded “Serb collabora-
tors,” but many were victimized because crime flourished extravagantly in the lawless 
environment, where weapons were ubiquitous, the KLA was still armed, and there was 
no rule of law. See Amnesty International, 2000.
23 Amnesty International, Kosovo: Six months on, climate of violence and fear flies 
in the face of UN mission, 23 December 1999, at https://amnesty.org/en/library/as-
set/EUR70/136/1999/en/1e3cf8ca-8675-48a5-a026-d581e2c233e2/eur701361999en.
pdf; see also Fisk 1999.
24 According to the November 1999 joint report by UNHCR and OSCE, non-Alba-
nians faced: A climate of violence and impunity, as well as widespread discrimination, 
harassment and intimidation directed at non-Albanians. The combination of security 
concerns, restricted movement, lack of access to public services (especially education, 
medical/health care and pensions) are the determining factors in the departure of Serbs, 
primarily, and other non-Albanian groups from Kosovo to date. See UNHCR/OSCE, 
“Overview of the situation of ethnic minorities in Kosovo”, 3 November 1999. 
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Secretary-General of the United Nations stated in a report that despite 
the efforts of UNMIK and KFOR “the level and nature of the violence 
in Kosovo, especially against vulnerable minorities, remains unaccept-
able”.25
After June 1999, there are no Serbs left in public, administrative 
and governmental institutions; Serbs are systematically excluded from 
the political, social, and economic power centres, being fired on ethnic 
basis from hospitals to mines.26 The situation of the Serb community in 
Kosovo has remained the same for the past ten years — plagued by con-
tinuous human rights violations, isolation from the Albanian-dominated 
Kosovo society, and problems with basic living conditions. The Serb com-
munity has been denied civil and political rights, such as the right to 
life, freedom of movement, freedom of expression, freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion and the right to use one’s own language. In the 
field of social, economic and cultural rights they are denied, among oth-
ers, the right to education, to health care and the right to participate in 
cultural life.27
In response, in order to secure the very survival of the Kosovo Serbs, 
the Serbian government set up a so-called “parallel” system, operating in 
Serb-majority areas and enclaves, providing public services otherwise in-
accessible for the Serb community — in health, education, and adminis-
tration. As human rights reports have continued to show over the years, 
Kosovo “remains one of the most segregated places in Europe, with thou-
sands of displaced persons still in camps, and many ‘ethnically pure’ towns 
25 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration 
Mission in Kosovo, UN Doc. no. S/1999/1250, 23 December 1999, p. 24. 
26 In order to satisfy conditions for attaining status (the so-called “standards for status” 
package), there have been some half-hearted attempts on the part of Kosovo Albani-
ans to include token Serbs into Kosovo institutions, including two ministers (of Social 
Welfare and Labour, and of Communities and Returns). However, since the majority 
of Serbs do not participate in the Kosovo-wide elections, the Kosovo Serb community 
does not consider these politicians their true representatives. These efforts are a far cry 
from genuine political power and participation in state institutions and government.
27 U.S. Department of State, 2008 Human Rights report: Kosovo, February 2009, at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eur/119462.htm (last accessed January 20, 
2010); Ombudsperson, Eighth Annual Report 2007–2008, July 2008, at http://www.
ombudspersonkosovo.org/?cid=2,74 (last accessed November 20, 2009); Minority 
Rights Group International, Minority Rights in Kosovo under International Rule, July 
2006, at http://www.minorityrights.org/1072/reports/minority-rights-in-kosovo-un-
der-international-rule.html (last accessed November 20, 2009).
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and villages.”28 It faces major problems related to minority communities,29 
such as “cases of politically and ethnically motivated violence; societal an-
tipathy against the Kosovo Serbs and the Serbian Orthodox Church; lack of 
progress in returning internally displaced persons to their homes;30 societal 
violence, abuse, and discrimination against minority communities.”31 The 
predicament of the Serb minority in Kosovo stems from systematic dis-
crimination, which has been institutionalized on different levels in favour 
of Kosovo Albanians.
Media discourse and conflicT
Discrimination and conflict are governed by ideologies32 and the inherent 
polarization between Us and Them,33 which are expressed through discourse 
(Van Dijk 2000) — both public and vernacular. In order to understand 
conflict-sustaining dynamics and the power relations underlying them, it is 
necessary to look at patterns of representing the Other in discourse.34 As 
28 Minority Rights Group International, Minority Rights in Kosovo under Interna-
tional Rule, July 2006, at 
http://www.minorityrights.org/1072/reports/minority-rights-in-kosovo-under-inter-
national-rule.html (last accessed November 20, 2009).
29 See reports of the Kosovo Ombusperson office at http://www.ombudspersonkosovo.
org/ (last accessed November 20, 2009).
30 According to UNHCR, by June 2007, out of a total of around 250,000 IDPs only 
7,000 returned. It is important to note, however, that this figure includes all non-Al-
banian IDPs, that most of the returnees are in fact Roma, and that UNHCR does not 
record returnees who have subsequently left Kosovo. The general trend is for Serbs to 
leave Kosovo. See Bataković, ed. 2007; Human Rights Watch, 2006; Minority Rights 
Group International 2009.
31 U.S. Department of State, February 2009.
32 Ideologies are general, abstract, shared social beliefs that underlie social representa-
tions, function as identity self-schemas, and form the basis for knowledge and cogni-
tion; they are essential in the management of thinking and interaction, particularly for 
social group relations, such as those of domination and conflict. See Van Dijk 2000.
33 Polarization is a structural characteristic of ideologies, and is embodied in the opposi-
tion between Us and Them. In ethnic conflicts, such as the one in Kosovo, the process 
of identity formation is even more polarized, because it has to sustain the conflict dy-
namics, and is based on ideologies that identify the in-group positively, while ascribing 
extreme negative characteristics to the out-group and anchoring self-identification in 
radical opposition (Kelman 1999). 
34 Following Van Dijk (1989), I understand discourse “both as a specific form of lan-
guage use, and as a specific form of social interaction, interpreted as a complete commu-
nicative event in a social situation.” I also use the notion of text in the sense of written 
discourse. As Foucault (1980) argues, discourse is a mode of political and ideological 
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Fiske (1993) reminds, the power to represent is real power — employing 
representation to produce “otherness” and the Other as different, and at 
times inferior, means exercising the “power of representation” over those 
being produced as others.
The media, as one of the main ideological institutions or Ideological 
Apparatus (Althusser 1984), is necessary for the effective reproduction and 
implementation of ideologies. Through public discourse, the media play a 
vital role in shaping identity, supplying information and images through 
which we understand ourselves and others, forming public consciousness, 
and influencing public policy (Fowler 1991; Kellner 1995; Neuman, Just 
& Crigler 1992; Parenti 1986; Robinson 2000; Weimann 2000). Adhering 
to the basic dynamics of how ideologies function in order to be useful for 
maintaining power relations, the media produce and reproduce positive in-
group and negative out-group images (Hall 1982 and 1985) which contrib-
ute to the process of group identity formation (social, ethnic and national) 
(Anderson 1991; Bhabha 1990; Bruner 2002; Clay 1996).
A) Media and identities in war and peace
a) Media and minorities
One of the more enduring findings in communication research concerns 
the propensity of the news media to reflect dominant social attitudes and 
to reinforce the distribution of social and political power in society (Cro-
teau & Hoynes 1997; Davis 1990; Gamson et al. 1992). This finding has 
been especially prominent in studies that look at the portrayal of minorities 
(Campbell 1995; Entman 1990; Van Dijk 1988), which show that the me-
dia usually have two ways of dealing with minority groups — they ignore 
them, unless they are perceived as a threat, in which case they discredit them 
(Avraham, Wolfsfeld & Aburaiya 2000). As media give priority to powerful 
people and groups, because of their social, political, economic and cultural 
power and influence (Van Dijk 1996), low status groups, such as minorities, 
usually are considered newsworthy only when they are associated with some 
form of deviance (Wolfsfeld 1997). The consequence is that the existing 
social and political gaps between the majority and minority are reinforced 
and amplified. 
According to Wolfsfeld (1997), media coverage of minorities in con-
ditions of political and identity conflicts, is composed of four major char-
acteristics: 
practice, which establishes, sustains and changes power relations, as well as the groups 
between which these power relations operate.
Balcanica XLII176
(1) a negative context and focus on disorder events, such as disasters, 
perversions, crime, violence, riots, extremism, subversion, or threats 
to the public order; 
(2) attributing to members of the minority group set motifs and 
similar traits — exotic, strange, different, and irrational — through 
extensive use of prejudices, generalizations, and stereotypes; 
(3) holding members of the minority group responsible for their own 
fate and presenting them as being incapable of changing their pres-
ent reality and; 
(4) the social, economic, and political developments regarding the 
minority group are covered superficially, without mention of the 
background, reasons, or context that lead up to them. 
All of these characteristics are essential in facilitating and perpetuat-
ing conflict. 
b) Media as facilitators of conflict
In conflict, as Galtung (1968) argues, media are responsible for what he calls 
“cultural violence” — an invisible form of violence, maintained by cultural 
institutions. The media can serve to justify, and even incite direct violence,35 
while disseminating discrimination and sustaining “structural violence”, 
which involves social inequality, repression and power imbalance, and is 
manifested in different kinds of social injustices, repressive institutions and 
institutionalized prejudice. As such, media have the power to influence con-
flict, but also peace. As Bratić (2008) says, “media become a venue that can 
give life to the artefacts of conflict and the ideas for peace”.
In intractable and prolonged conflict, the role of the media is essen-
tial also because in such situations there is most often no direct communica-
tion between rival groups. Rather, such communication is restricted to and 
passes mostly through mass media (Anastasious 2002) — as an impersonal 
exchange of destructive messages and stereotypes, through what, in time, 
become standardized, mutual accusations, characterizations, self-victimiza-
tion, and a rhetoric based on one-sided, skewed, and nationalist assump-
tions. In such situations, the media discourse of each side seems to mirror 
that of the other, because the frameworks reproduced are identical. Also, 
because the frameworks emphasize negative characteristics of the Other, as 
35 In terms of ethnic conflict, many studies focusing on the media involvement in the 
conflicts in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia show the dangerous impact of the media 
in disseminating hate messages and their role in mass scale violence. See Des Forges 
1999; Kirschke 1996; Metzl 1997; Buric 2000; Sadkovich 1998; Thompson 1999; Tay-
lor and Kent 2000; Kurspahić 2003.
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the ‘enemy’ of the nation, they additionally hinder the establishing of direct 
communicative contact.
The rhetoric disseminated through the mass media not only thrives 
under conditions of protracted and intractable conflict, but it also generates 
an effective, general uniformity of thought within the group, precipitated 
around the major axis of the dispute (Ellul 1973; Orwell 1949). Indeed, 
many media theorists have argued that the very structure of the mass media 
tends to facilitate the establishment of generalized stereotypes (McLuhan 
1964; Meyrowitz 1985), and thus the stereotypical patterns of national-
ism are congruous with the way the media function (Anastasious 2002). As 
Wolfsfeld (2001) emphasizes, “the media tend to have an obsessive interest 
in threats and violence.” In times of conflict, the media disseminate images 
that help to clearly distinguish between Us and Them, strengthen in-group 
cohesiveness, and maintain constant opposition to the out-group, through 
extreme negative portrayals and characterizations (Auerbach & Bloch-El-
kon 2005; Bloch & Lehman-Wilzig 2002; Van Dijk 1989; Hammond & 
Herman 2000; Herring 2000; Iyengar 1988; Taylor 2000; Vincent 2000). 
c) Media for peace and reconciliation
Apart from their prominent role in war-building, the media also have the 
potential to positively influence conflict contexts, by transforming negative 
stereotypes and reducing prejudice (Crocker, Hampson & Aall 2004; Darby 
& MacGinty 2003; Lynch 2005; Wolfsfeld 2004). Just as they can dissemi-
nate messages that incite hatred and fuel conflict, so they have the ability 
to deliver messages of peace and contribute to conflict resolution (How-
ard, Rolt & Verhoeven 2003; Price & Thompson 2002; Wolfsfeld 2004). If 
the symbolic environment is impacted by the messages of peace-oriented 
media, it can be conducive to the cultural transformation of violence. This 
requires though not only peace-oriented media production, but also a thor-
ough change in attitudes and perceptions, as well as the integration of such 
efforts into other social institutions and processes (Bratic 2008). Just as pro-
war propaganda cannot single-handedly cause conflicts, the peace-oriented 
media cannot single-handedly end them. 
Despite this positive potential, in Kosovo both Albanian and Ser-
bian media36 have for years played a fundamental role in producing and 
36 While there are Serb media in Kosovo, they are mostly commercial, entertainment-
oriented radio broadcasters, and the Serb community relies overwhelmingly on media 
from Serbia for its news and information. See http://www.ks.undp.org/?cid=2,26,813 
(last accessed November 20, 2009). The most-watched television station by the Serb 
population is RTS, Serbia’s state broadcaster, while the most popular dailies are Bel-
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reproducing conflict ideologies through discourse that is characterized by 
extreme stereotypes of the Other, prejudiced language, justifications of vio-
lence against the Other, and validations of power imbalances and discrimi-
natory practices.37 
B) Media landscape in Kosovo: Institutions, discourse and practice
a) Albanian-language media in Kosovo
From 1990 until 1999, there was only one television station in Kosovo, 
broadcasting mostly in Serbian, except a daily half-hour news show in Al-
banian.38 After the Serbian authorities withdrew in June 1999 and UNMIK 
arrived, the local Kosovo Albanian media proliferated.39 Between1999 and 
2006, the international community invested an estimated 36 million euro 
into media assistance.40 
grade-based Večernje novosti, Blic, Kurir, Press and Glas javnosti. See Balkan Insight, 
Belgrade media keep Kosovo Serbs in the dark, September 2006, at http://www.b92.
net/eng/insight/opinions.php?yyyy=2006&mm=09&nav_id=37019 (last accessed No-
vember 20, 2009). Few local media outlets produce their own news and information 
programs, but instead transmit reports from Belgrade-based media, and thus neglect 
news from the whole of Kosovo. Kosovo Public TV provides little genuine program 
in Serbian. The reliance on Belgrade dailies for information increases and strengthens 
the sense of insecurity and isolation of Kosovo Serbs, as the Serbian media in general 
emphasize negative stereotypes about the Kosovo Albanians, strengthening conflict dy-
namics. See Youth Initiative for Human Rights 2006, 2005.
37 Youth Initiative for Human Rights, Report on Written Media in Kosovo, August-
October 2006, at http://www.yihr.org/uploads/reports/eng/18.pdf (last accessed No-
vember 20, 2009); Youth Initiative for Human Rights, Journalists Can Do It, 2005, 
at http://www.yihr.org/uploads/publications/eng/8.pdf (last accessed November 20, 
2009); OSCE, The State of Media Freedom in Kosovo: Observations and Recommen-
dations, July 2006, at http://www.osce.org/documents/rfm/2006/07/19767_en.pdf (last 
accessed November 20, 2009); OSCE (2004), Human Rights Challenges following the 
March Riots, at http://www.osce.org/documents/mik/2004/05/2939_en.pdf (last ac-
cessed January 20, 2010).
38 For early development of Kosovo Albanian media, see Judah 2000.
39 There are over 100 electronic media outlets; around 90 are radio stations, while more 
than 22 are television broadcasters. There are 3 Kosovo-wide TV broadcasters – the 
government-funded RTK and two commercial TV stations. RTK has approximately 
10% of its programming time in 4 minority languages. The media reflect the mainly-
Albanian ethnic composition, as almost two-thirds operate in the Albanian language, 
while the rest use Serbian or are multi-lingual.
40 OSCE, July 2006.
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There are eight daily Albanian-language newspapers, with an esti-
mated total circulation of 30,000 copies, as well as five weeklies and a num-
ber of other periodicals.41 In terms of journalism quality, the low budget, 
very limited profit, and lack of professional education and training, spells 
low quality and little or no editorial independence. According to media 
monitoring reports,42 there are basic errors in journalistic practices,43 and 
professional standards are not high; in general, the media in Kosovo strive 
towards sensationalist and shallow information. 
In addition, journalism mainly serves a specific party or group.44 Nev-
ertheless, Albanian-language media in Kosovo can be considered “national” 
media, in that they help create the Kosovo Albanian nation, sustaining the 
“imagined community” (Anderson 2001). Following Gellner (1983), it 
could be said that the media present the Kosovo Albanian nation as ab-
solute, sacred and mono-ethnic, militant in its concept of defense and its 
means of freedom, and in conflictual juxtaposition with the Other, the “en-
emy” — the Serbs. 
According to agencies and organizations that monitor media cov-
erage related to minorities,45 the Albanian-language print media in gen-
eral tend to “create a dichotomy between OUR [Albanian] side, which 
is better and constructive, and THEIR [Serbian] side, which is bad and 
destructive” and “take part in the radicalization of inter-ethnic relations 
in Kosovo.”46
41 There is only one bilingual Albanian-Serbian language newspaper, the weekly M 
Magazine. The bi-weekly Gradjanski glasnik is published in Serbian but has a mixed 
office, the publisher being Albanian and the editor Serbian.
42 OSCE, July 2006.
43 Such as citing only one source of information, not separating news from commentary, 
and relying mostly on the statements of public officials to create stories.
44 Government and party advertising is the life-blood of Kosovo newspapers, which 
struggle to make money given poor copy sales and a relatively underdeveloped advertis-
ing sector. See Balkan Insight, BIRN Show Triggers Row on Freedom of Speech in Ko-
sovo, June 2009, at http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/analysis/20169/?tpl=297 
(last accessed January 20, 2010); see also KIPRED, Monitoring of media during the 
election campaign in Kosovo, February 2008 http://www.kipred.net/site/documents/
eng_media.pdf (last accessed January 20, 2010). 
45 Youth Initiative for Human Rights 2006, 2005; OSCE, July 2006.
46 Youth Initiative for Human Rights 2006.
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b) Critical discourse analysis of conflict-sustaining ideologies
In order to examine closely the representations of the Serb minority47 in 
Albanian-language newspapers, I have chosen critical discourse analysis 
(CDA), because as Van Dijk suggests, it provides a thorough systematic 
account of the levels, structures, units and strategies of text, as well as a de-
tailed analysis of the many properties of context, which is necessary in order 
to analyze the discursive expression and reproduction of ideologies  (Van 
Dijk 1997; Duranti & Goodwin 1992; Ellis 1998; Huckin 1992; Potter, 
Edwards & Wetherell 1993; Tannen 1981). As media production reflects, 
and is linked to, the dominant ideological and economic forces in society, I 
consider CDA a particularly suitable form of analysis, because it provides 
the theoretical and methodological context that can articulate explicitly the 
relationship between ideologies, language practices and the socio-political 
world (Fairclough 1992). It allows not only to distinguish discourse practic-
es that contribute to the production and reproduction of dominant ideolo-
gies, but also to the perpetuation of stereotypes, prejudice, discrimination, 
even violence, and thus intractable-conflict dynamics (Van Dijk 1998). 
This study looks at articles dealing with Serb-related issues from Al-
banian-language newspapers in Kosovo: Koha Ditore, Kosova Sot, Express, 
Zëri, Epoka e Re, Lajm, Bota Sot and InfoPress, from March 1st to May 31st, 
2009.48 Using the daily UNMIK media monitoring service,49 I selected all 
47 The choice of focusing only on the Serbian community is guided by several reasons. 
First, even though the conflict in Kosovo affected, and still affects all non-Albanian 
ethnic groups, the conflict itself was not, and is not between Albanians and all other 
non-Albanian groups, but between Albanians and Serbs. Thus, in terms of intractable 
conflict dynamics the main issue is the relationship between the Albanian majority and 
the Serb minority. It is important to note that while the Serb community is discussed in 
this article, this minority, as every community, is not homogeneous in terms of political 
inclinations, identity and responses to policies or developments; there are regional, local, 
political and identity differences, often profound, within the community. Yet they share 
the same predicament, of being the minority in an ethnic state, and at the same time, 
they are “homogenized” by the Albanian-language media. Moreover, in the months 
analyzed here, there were only 5 articles related to other minorities.
48 I chose to include all Albanian-language daily newspapers in order to analyze a broad 
range of media outlets and look for possible differences and divergences. However, the 
analysis shows that even though there are significant differences between newspapers 
in reporting about local politics, there is consensus and coherence on reporting about 
Serb-related issues in the three months analyzed, and a lack of divergent perspectives 
and voices. In other words, nationalism cuts across party lines.
49 UNMIK media monitoring service provides daily reviews and translations of Alba-
nian-language media in Kosovo and Serbian-language media in Serbia; the reports pro-
vide full lists of headlines and articles and translations of selected articles, focusing on 
main events, political developments and issues pertaining to Albanian-Serb relations.
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articles that dealt with or mentioned Serbs and issues pertinent to the Serb 
minority, including articles that are related to Serbia and the government 
in Belgrade. I chose to include the latter category of articles for two main 
reasons. First, the Serbian population, treated as minority in Kosovo is per-
ceived as being inextricably linked with Belgrade and Serbia,50 and very 
often Albanian language media do not make a distinction.51 Second, the 
Serbian government in Belgrade is most often cited as speaking for the Serb 
community in Kosovo, and thus the community is for the most part identi-
fied with the Serbian government and Serbia in general.
The following analysis examines the discourse of Albanian-language 
newspapers concerning Serbs, looking at master narratives (Hackett & Zhao 
1994), framing (Goffman 1974), discursive strategies (Donati 1992), such 
as rhetorical devices (compare and contrast, hyperbole and euphemism), 
and lexicalization (Van Dijk 1997; 2000). Following van Dijk, I assert that 
epistemically it is not the truth value of ideologies, but their cognitive and 
social role, i.e. their effectiveness and usefulness, that is important in power 
relations of domination and discrimination. Therefore, my intention in the 
analysis is not to ascertain or discuss the truth value of the media discourse, 
but rather to investigate what kinds of representations are dominant and 
how the ideologies produced and reproduced function in terms of conflict 
dynamics and socio-political implications.
c) Threat as master narrative
Master narratives are analytic reference frameworks that are used to catego-
rize and analyze events and processes related to various issue or areas, such 
as “world order”, “security”, “humanitarian”, etc. When repeated frequently 
and/or authenticated and acknowledged by multiple public authorities like 
state institutions, community leaders, government officials or intellectual 
authority these dominant scripts become the “Truth”. Since they privilege 
certain interpretations, while marginalizing others (Foucault 1978), they 
50 According to media monitoring reports Albanian-language media focus on the strong 
and persistent attachment of the Kosovo Serb community to the government in Bel-
grade. Politicians from Serbia regularly receive a lot of negative coverage; they are usu-
ally featured using nicknames and reminders of what the Serbian regime did in Kosovo 
in the 1990s. See Youth Initiative for Human Rights 2006, 2005; OSCE, July 2006.
51 An illustrative example is the coverage of an incident on March 24, where Kosovo 
Police stopped Serbian government officials coming from Belgrade, at the border cross-
ing, denying them entry. Albanian language media reported the incident with headlines 
such as “Kosovo: Forbidden land for Serbs” (InfoPress); Bota Sot ran an article entitled 
“You don’t step anymore in Kosovo,” and argued that “Serbs will not be allowed entry 
into Kosovo anymore.”
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serve as legitimization strategies in maintaining hegemonic power relations 
(Bamberg 2005), affecting, like ideologies, thinking and behaviour ( James-
on 1984).
The master narrative that comes out of the analysis of the articles in 
the three months selected is that of “threat” — the threat that Kosovo Al-
banians continue to face from Kosovo Serbs and the rest of Serbia; a threat 
that is portrayed as historical and constant. This master narrative implies 
that Serbs are enemies, to be feared, contested, fought against; conflict is 
thus the normal state of affairs. 
The master narrative of the Other as threat is common in intractable 
conflict, and it serves to motivate group members to strengthen their nega-
tive beliefs about the Other, making thus the master narrative itself even 
more resistant to change and transformation (Hackett & Zhao 1994). The 
conflict is hence perceived not only as an individual physical threat, but 
as metaphysically threatening the entire imagined community. The fight 
against the Other surpasses personal struggle, and takes on historical, tra-
ditional and heroic proportions. The master narrative of threat is revealed 
through two main interpretative news frames — “threat to state” and “threat 
to security”. 
d) Frames
Frames are ideological shapings of discourse, “drawing on well-established 
social orientations, attitudes, values and other group beliefs” (Donati 1992). 
They relate to specific themes that are linked to a given issue, or master nar-
rative. Public issues are framed by mentioning certain relevant topics and 
subtopics, while ignoring others. Huckin (2002) calls the latter “significant 
silences” and underscores the power of silence to affect communication and 
perceptions; such silences are a common feature of news discourse (Reese & 
Buckalew 1995) and other forms of public discourse.52
The two main frames that come out of this analysis — the Threat 
to State and the Threat to Security — are characterized further by topics 
and sub-topics, which conform to Van Dijk’s “ideological square” of positive 
self-presentation and negative other-presentation. Van Dijk demonstrates 
that topics are selected according to how favourable they are for the in-
group, and therefore negative for the out-group; they are derived from an 
event model, which in this case is “conflict”. In the articles analyzed, the Al-
52 As Van Dijk notes (1986, 178), “the ideological nature of discourse in general, and of 
news discourse in particular, is often defined by the unsaid. Information that could (or 
should) have been given is selectively left out.” 
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banian-language media select topics that embody the four moves that Van 
Dijk (2000) suggests are basic in ideological discourse about the Other:
1) Express/emphasize information that is ‘positive’ about us.
2) Express/emphasize information that is ‘negative’ about them.
3) Suppress/de-emphasize information that is ‘positive’ about them.
4) Suppress/de-emphasize information that is ‘negative’ about us.
According to the results of this analysis, the Threat to State frame has 
two main topics — denying statehood, and disrupting institutional order 
and hindering economic progress, while the Threat to Security frame has 
three key topics — extremism, criminal activities, and war crimes and hu-
man rights violations. 
The Threat to State Frame(s) 
The Threat to State Frame 1: Denying statehood
Articles that fall under this topic concern the dispute over the status of 
Kosovo, its declaration of independence and its territorial integrity,53 and 
use language that presents the dispute as a “fierce” conflict, even “war”: 
“Kosovo and Serbia to have fierce clash at the Hague” (Epoka e Re, April 
15)
“Kosovo and Serbia start confrontation of arguments in Hague” (Zëri, 
April 16)
“The war at the Hague starts” (Epoka e Re, April 17)
And the Kosovo Albanians as being on the defensive against Serbia’s at-
tacks:54
“Kosovo ready to defend independence in Hague” (Epoka e Re, April 16)
“Declaration for the protection of independence handed over” (Bota 
Sot, April 16)
“History and legality of independence are defended” (Koha Ditore, April 20)
53 As Serb government officials continue to claim that the February 2008 declaration 
of independence is illegal, and that Kosovo is still a part of Serbia, the case is being 
debated at the International Court of Justice in the Hague. Both sides presented their 
arguments in April 2009. 
54 The same kind of language, presenting the dispute as a “harsh battle”, was used to 
describe the events at the Islamic Conference in May 2009: “A harsh battle for Kosovo 
in Damask” (Koha Ditore, May 25); “In Damask, Kosovo and Serbia fight for resolution” 
(Zëri, May 25).
Balcanica XLII184
Articles also frame the dispute as a competition, keeping “score” of wins 
and losses:55
“Editorial: Albanian diplomacy beats Serbia” (Kosova Sot, May 26)
… Kosovo should thank Albania for the success achieved at the summit of the 
Organisation of Islamic Conference. Even though Serbia “wholeheartedly” lob-
bied against the approved resolution, the Conference came out with a very fa-
vorable position on Kosovo. 
This topic also comprises numerous Albanian articles that report the fre-
quent statements of Belgrade officials regarding the territorial belonging of 
Kosovo to Serbia:
“Tadić in Kosovo: “This is Serbia” (Koha Ditore, April 18) 
Prime Minister Thaçi has set some conditions to allow Serbia’s President to visit 
Kosovo, and among them he insisted that Tadić should not make any political 
statement in contradiction to Kosovo’s Constitution. However, Tadić has not 
refrained from political announcements and in his statement he said that he 
considered Kosovo as a part of Serbia. “My message today is a message of peace, 
peace for Serbs and Albanians who live in Kosovo, in our Serbia. Without peace 
we cannot secure decent living. Without faith in peace we cannot live normal 
lives,” said Tadić. 
The statement of the Serbian President, on the occasion of the Orthodox 
Easter, caused great indignation, and the newspapers reported it not only 
as a violation of Kosovo’s sovereignty,56 but also as a typical characteristic 
of the Serbian Orthodox Church, as in the following example from Epoka 
e Re (April 18):
At the church, Tadić “privately” attacks Kosovo and this reminds us of the role 
of the Serbian Church against Kosovo.
Significantly, the Serbian Orthodox Church, which is one of the main Serb 
institutions in Kosovo, and one of the most prominent representatives of 
the interests of the Serb community, is presented here (and elsewhere) as 
being against the independence of Kosovo; the implication is that it is not 
part of Kosovo, and its population. Further, the statements of Belgrade offi-
cials57 regarding the unsettled status of Kosovo appear frequently, such as:
“Ivanović: Kosovo status is a “transitional status” (Zëri, May 18)
The State Secretary in the so-called Ministry for Kosovo in Serbia’s government, 
Oliver Ivanović, considers Kosovo’s status as a transitional status. 
55 “We believe in the triumph of Kosovo over Serbia” (Bota Sot, April 17).
56 “Tadic violates Kosovo sovereignty” (Bota Sot, April 18).
57 It is common practice in Albanian-language newspapers to use “so-called” when re-
ferring to officials of the Serbian Ministry for Kosovo and Metohija, thus underlining 
the position of the media toward the institutions representing the Serbs in Kosovo.
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“While some Kosovo Albanians and some countries with influence in the world 
are calling the status finally solved, we consider it transitional status. And it can 
only be final when the appropriate solution can be found in an agreement that 
the authorities in Serbia and its people accept,” said Ivanović.
Particularly the Serb-controlled north of Kosovo is presented as a threat to 
the Albanian-dominated Kosovo:
“AAK: State of Kosovo at risk from divided Mitrovica” (Koha Ditore, 
March 15)
The party’s deputy leader Blerim Shala said at the convention that the divided 
town of Mitrovica is threatening the state of Kosovo. “Mitrovica has remained 
stuck in its fate as a divided town, without whose unification there can be no 
territorial integrity for Kosovo. The freedom of Kosovo is only partial as long 
as Mitrovica remains divided. With such a Mitrovica, the state of Kosovo is at 
risk,” Shala was quoted as saying.
and its sovereignty:58
“Rexhepi: Sovereignty is threatened in the north” (Koha Ditore, March 23)
The north of Kosovo is considered one of the main problems for Kosovo, 
and for the Kosovo Albanians (and also many international representatives) 
is associated with “radical”,  “extremist”, “criminal” and even “terrorist” ac-
tivities.
The Threat to State Frame 2: Disrupting institutional order 
The Serbs in Kosovo are seen as contesting the Kosovo state and disrupting 
its institutional order through the presence of Serbian institutions, called 
“parallel structures”:
“Salihaj: Acceptance of the Serb parallel structures destroys the sov-
ereignty” (Bota Sot, March 23)
These “structures” are described as violating Kosovo’s laws and “sabotaging 
the statehood of Kosovo”, as in the following excerpt:
“EULEX and UNMIK have contacts with parallel structures” (Koha 
Ditore, March 20)
58 In the years since 1999 there have been many suggestions regarding the division of 
Kosovo, coming both from some Serb officials and analysts and international actors, 
according to which the Ibar river, a de facto border now, should be instituted as a de jure 
division line, and the north of Kosovo remaining within Serbia. However, Serbs living 
south of the river Ibar have always been strongly against that plan, and this is one of 
the few points where they agree with Kosovo Albanians, who decisively contest such a 
division.
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Representatives of EULEX and UNMIK have admitted openly that they have 
regular contacts with Serb parallel structures in Kosovo, adding that they don’t 
legitimize their presence. The dialogue international officials have with Serb 
leaders, who refuse and are sabotaging the statehood of Kosovo, EULEX and 
UNMIK evaluate as having contact with leaders of the community, which have 
the aim to find pragmatically solutions for different issues. 
The illegitimacy of these institutions (although legal since 1999 in terms 
of being democratically elected), is emphasized repeatedly, while their pur-
pose and reason, namely to provide services that are otherwise unavailable 
to the Serb community, are neither mentioned nor explained. Through the 
frequent use of words such as “illegitimate,” and “parallel”, the institutions 
operating in the Serb-inhabited enclaves, which deal primarily with health 
care, education, welfare, and municipal government, are presented in a neg-
ative light and associated with illegality and illegal activities. They are also 
presented as purely political, and with the sole purpose of opposing the 
Kosovo state, and even associated with terrorism:
“Parallel structures, elements of terrorism” (Bota Sot, March 31)
Also, by referring to institutions such as medical centres, schools, cultural 
houses, community centres and municipal services as “structures”, they are 
mystified and their function — taking care of the basic needs of the Serb 
community — is obscured and distorted. The close link that is presented 
between the “parallel structures” and Belgrade adds to this obfuscation, 
through the use of language that connotes a sort of deviance: 
“Serbia ‘feeds’ parallel structures in Kosovo” (Lajm, March 6)
In certain articles, the “parallel structures” are blamed for damaging the in-
terests of the Serb community59 in Kosovo, through promoting segrega-
tion:
“Parallel structures prevent integration of Serbs” (Lajm, May 15)
and significantly, because of Belgrade’s influence:
“ICO and Government meet with Serbs to discuss various problems” 
(Zëri, April 4)
Here, the Kosovo government official is quoted as saying that a part of the 
Serbs is “an obstacle for integration” while another part of the Serbs are 
under “Belgrade’s direct influence”, which is “impeding the integration [of 
Serbs] in political and institutional life”. The negative influence of “Bel-
grade” is a common theme in the articles analyzed, voiced both by Kosovo 
Albanian politicians and international representatives and organizations. 
59 “Serbs looking for jobs threatened by parallel structures” (Koha Ditore, May 26).
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In the articles analyzed, neither the role of the Kosovo Albanian in-
stitutions in preventing and hindering such integration, nor the difficulties 
that Serbs face in living in Kosovo is mentioned; divergent viewpoints are 
not presented, and thus the complex problems of this minority community 
are simplified and attributed to self-segregation and Belgrade’s intentional 
policy of “undermining the independence of Kosovo”. 
The Serbian community is presented as continuously and stubbornly 
opposing all institutions of the Kosovo state:
“Serbs ignore constitutional court” (InfoPress, April 7)
“Kosovo Serbs ignore Constitution Day” (Zëri, April 10)
The “refusal” to participate in and accept Kosovo institutions is not placed in 
a context that would shed light on the various and multifaceted reasons be-
hind such policies, but rather the implication is that it is shear obstinacy: 
The Threat to State Frame 3: Draining the state of its resources 
Another theme that comes under the topic of Threat to the State portrays 
the Serbs as draining the self-proclaimed Kosovo state, because of their 
non-compliance and opposition to its institutions. Three particular cases are 
prominent in this theme during the months analyzed: suspended Serb po-
lice officers, non-payment of electricity bills, and decentralization of Serb-
majority areas. In all three cases, the newspapers focus on the detrimental 
consequences for the Kosovo, particularly economic: 
“Three million for 300 Serb police officers” (Infopress, May 15)
“Serbs owe 120 million to KEK” (Kosova Sot, May 12)
“Decentralisation costs us € 30 million” (Kosova Sot, May 4)
The Serb community is presented as draining the Kosovo budget and hin-
dering economic progress:
“Maliqi: The lesson from Sillovo” (Express, March 9)
The Sillovo incident is perhaps an introduction into a series of incidents in-
volving the Serb minority on the eve of the United Nations Security Council 
session. The Government of Kosovo should wage a clear and efficient campaign 
proving that the incident had nothing to do with minority rights, but that it 
is an issue of unpaid electricity debts and an unprecedented usurpation of the 
limited energy resource in Kosovo. 
This opinion piece not only refutes that the issue is a violation of minor-
ity rights, but undercuts the importance of the protests, by implying their 
falsity and a sort of conspiracy against the Kosovo state. This mirrors the 
official stance of the Kosovo government on the issue of disconnections of 
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Serb villages, and the protests that inevitably follow. The “debt” of the Serb 
community in Kosovo to KEK is a recurrent theme in the months analyzed, 
and thus the word is used frequently.
“Thaçi: There is no discrimination in Silovo, the energy has to be 
paid” (Lajm, March 11)
“21 police officers injured in a Serb protest” (Koha Ditore, May 12)
21 members of Kosovo Police were injured in a protest of local Serbs along 
the Gjilane-Bujanovac road. Serbs, still deprived of basic human rights, jobless 
and discriminated  on ethnic basis were protesting their disconnection from the 
power supply for failure to settle their debts to KEK. KEK said that the villages 
inhabited mainly by the Serb community owe over €150 million in unpaid bills 
and insisted that the disconnection was not done on an ethnic basis. 
This complex and long-standing problem, which has been plaguing the Serb 
community living in the enclaves for many years,60 as well as the Kosovo Al-
banian population and everyone living in Kosovo, is simplified, and placed 
in the context of “conflict”; significantly, the fact that a sizable part of the 
Kosovo Albanian population does not pay electricity bills, including some 
official institutions,61 is not mentioned either.
It is important to note that in the articles analyzed, only Kosovo 
Albanian officials are cited, while the Serbs who are affected by the lack of 
electricity are not quoted; thus, their voice is not heard and their problems 
are viewed only through the perspective of the Kosovo Albanian officials. 
60 All of Kosovo is affected by the problem of electricity supply, and that power cuts do 
not affect only Serb-inhabited areas, but the entire territory and population. Second, it 
is also important to remember that many Kosovo Albanians do not pay for electricity 
either (see for example, UNDP 2006). In fact, the non-payment of electricity bills to 
KEK is a Kosovo-wide problem, and there are also public institutions which do not 
pay for their electricity; see U.S. Department of State, February 2009. Another factor 
affecting the issue with electricity cuts is that Serb enclaves are in rural areas, which 
throughout Kosovo receive less electricity than urban areas. The difference in electric-
ity supply between rural and urban areas can be hours, but sometimes also days; to 
give an example, while in Priština there are 2 hour electricity cuts each 4 hours, in the 
Serb enclave of Gračanica there are 8 hour electricity cuts per 12 hours, and often even 
more. The general Kosovo problem of power cuts and non-payment of electricity bills 
is further exacerbated because the Serb population openly refuses to pay electricity bills 
to KEK, the Kosovo Energy Corporation; for years, the Serb community has been de-
manding that another provider, the Serbian electricity company, as the rightful owner 
of all Kosovo electricity sources, be allowed to operate in Serb areas, but that has never 
been allowed by the Albanians. Every so often, Albanian-controlled KEK disconnects 
completely the power supply to a certain Serb-inhabited village, and protests inevitably 
arise after a few days of no electricity whatsoever. 
61 U.S. Department of State, February 2009.
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The Threat to Security Frame(s) 
The articles that correspond to the Threat to Security frame suggest that 
Serbs, and the Serbian government, threaten the security of the Kosovo 
“state”, through extremist behaviour and attitudes, criminal activities, and 
war crimes and human rights violations. 
In the following example, the Threat to Security frame is directly 
stated: 
“Krasniqi: Belgrade is guilty” (Epoka e Re, March 11)
… Kosovo Assembly Chairman Jakup Krasniqi said … “Belgrade is being led 
by a policy of boycott and non-recognition, a policy that wants to produce de-
stabilization and insecurity in Kosovo, and not a policy that wants to build new 
relations.”
The Threat to Security Frame 1: Extremism
This topic presents Kosovo Serbs, and Serbs in general, as being extremist 
in attitude and behaviour; the emphasis is on violence, such as protests, riots 
and similar, as “typical” of Serbs, particularly those in the north of Kosovo. 
Frequently, words such as “extremists” and “violent” are used to characterize 
Serbs and their actions:62
“EULEX as UNMIK, embraces the Serb extremists” (Bota Sot, March 3)
“Serb extremists fire weapons” (Bota Sot, March 24)
“Thaçi says Government does not surrender to extremists in Mitro-
vica” (Zëri, April 30)
“Serbs want violence, continue with explosions” (Bota Sot, April 30)
“We will not surrender before extremists” (Bota Sot, April 30)
One of the cases that illustrate this topic, and that received prominent status 
and much media attention in the articles analyzed, is the conflict over the 
reconstruction of several Albanian houses in the north of Kosovo: 
“Shots against the reconstruction of Albanian houses” (Koha Ditore, 
April 26)
Serb protesters fired shots during their attempts to impede the reconstruction of 
Albanian houses in Kroi i Vitakut in northern Mitrovica on Saturday.
The juxtaposition here, as in the following article, is between Albanians who 
are “carrying out the humanitarian project of rebuilding homes” and Serbs 
who respond with violence. 
62 One of the articles analyzed even compares Serbs to the Taleban: “Buzhala: Moderate 
Serb Taleban” (Express, March 11).
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“Work to resume today at ‘Kroi i Vitakut’, Police and KFOR on 
standby” (Zëri, April 27)
While carrying out the humanitarian project of rebuilding homes of Albanians 
in Kroi i Vitakut in the northern part of Mitrovica, Serbs have responded with 
firing guns on Friday and Saturday. … President Fatmir Sejdiu evaluated these 
incidents in Kroi i Vitakut as orchestrated by Serb leaders. He also said that no 
one can prevent the work in the north of the country or in other territories of 
Kosovo.
The articles analyzed, as in the following example, emphasize “intolerance” 
and extremely violent behaviour: 
“Attack with hand grenades on EULEX and KFOR” (Koha Ditore, April 
28)
The confrontation between Serb citizens and security forces in the tense north 
erupted again on Monday, with at least two hand grenades being thrown at EU-
LEX and KFOR peacekeepers. These incidents, which are caused by the intoler-
ance of Serbs toward the rebuilding of five Albanian houses in Kroi i Vitakut, 
included shots from guns, but did not claim any victims.
Some articles invoke the threat frame explicitly, using strong wording, lack-
ing verifiable data to create powerful images of Serb violence and aggres-
sion:
“Life under Serb snipers” (Lajm, April 28)
“With bullets against return” (Lajm, April 28)
“War status in Mitrovica, Serbs under arms!” (Bota Sot, April 28)
“Belgrade”, i.e. the Serbian government, is represented as being responsible, 
and as endorsing, or “silently blessing,” allegedly Serb-organized violence 
in Kosovo:
“Belgrade, the major causer of disorder in the north” (Lajm, May 7)
“International presence hesitates to mention Belgrade’s role” (Koha Di-
tore, May 14)
Representatives of the international community that work in the region have 
stated that the violence by Kosovo Serbs in the northern part of the country and 
in the Anamorava region transpired with the silent blessing of Belgrade. While 
senior U.S. diplomats directly point the finger at Serbian authorities and local 
extremist leaders for the recent events, the international presence in Kosovo is 
showing more restraint. “Belgrade’s influence on Kosovo Serbs is evident. We all 
know this and this is not a secret,” an international official told the paper, under 
the condition of anonymity.
The government in Belgrade is further accused of “inducing”  violence:63
63 Both Kosovo Albanian politicians and international actors are cited, linking the violent 
behaviour and attitudes of Kosovo Serbs with the Serbian government in Belgrade: 
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“Pristina accuses Belgrade for incidents in the north” (Zëri, April 29)
After Monday’s incident in Mitrovica north when 100 local Serbs tried to stop 
rebuilding five houses in Kroi i Vitakut by using violence and shooting, the 
situation yesterday was calmer. However, in the surrounding area unidentified 
individuals have stoned two EULEX vehicles, but except for material damages, 
there were no injuries. Kosovo President Fatmir Sejdiu accused on Tuesday of-
ficial Belgrade for inducing Kosovo Serbs to cause incidents in Mitrovica north, 
therefore he requested from the international community to make pressure on 
Serbia in order to stop the conflicts. “Last incidents in the north are caused by 
people dictated directly by Belgrade,” he said. 
The Threat to Security Frame 2: Criminal activities
In this second topic in the Threat to Security frame the articles emphasize 
the connection between Kosovo Serbs, particularly those living in the north, 
but not only, and criminal activities, such as smuggling and trafficking. 
“Border with Serbia, an open ‘door’ to smuggling” (Bota Sot, May 12)
Belgrade is also blamed for the criminal activities of Kosovo Serbs. The Ser-
bian government is accused of “smuggling crime into Kosovo”:
“Assembly Speaker Krasniqi accuses the UN” (Express, March 8)
Kosovo Assembly Speaker Jakup Krasniqi has (…) said there could be no tech-
nical dialogue with Serbia as long as the latter does not recognize Kosovo as an 
independent state and as long as it keeps smuggling crime into Kosovo.
Frequently, the articles state, lacking verifiable data, that encouraging crimi-
nal activities is in the interest of the Serbs and the Serbian government in 
order to destabilize the Kosovo state. 
“Serbia continues trafficking of arms in Kosovo” (Bota Sot, March 10)
This article repeats old stereotypes about the “Serbian terrorist system in 
Kosovo” and Serbian nationalism, linked with Serbian police crimes span-
ning more than a century, into the present day. Apart from being labelled 
as uncooperative in encouraging Kosovo Serbs to integrate, the Republic 
of Serbia is also portrayed as “[encouraging] and [supporting] illegal and 
criminal structures”: 
“U.S. calls on Belgrade to stop northern leaders” (Koha Ditore, May 11)
The U.S. Ambassador in Belgrade Cameron Munther said that in the northern part of 
Kosovo irresponsible Serb leaders are producing violence and constitute a danger for 
their safety and the safety of others. Munther called on Belgrade to stop these irrespon-
sible leaders.
“I am talking about people living in Mitrovica and your government knows who they are. 
These are people that incite violence; they are a threat to their safety and the safety of 
others. This is not the way to solve problems,” Munther was quoted as saying.
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“Disagreements at the UN, UNMIK stays in the game” (Koha Ditore, 
March 24)
Kosovo Foreign Minister Skënder Hyseni … enumerated the actions of the 
Kosovo government to improve the living conditions in the regions with mi-
nority communities, especially the Serb Community. “I will have to say that, 
after all, the Republic of Serbia was not at all helpful in this regard, because it 
continued the encouragement and support of illegal and criminal structures in 
the north,” Hyseni said, emphasizing that illegality in this part of the country is 
openly encouraged by Belgrade.
Consistently, it is the Serbs in north Kosovo who are most often linked with 
lawlessness and criminal activities; in fact, the north is often referred to as a 
“haven for smugglers” and a lawless territory:
“Thaçi: The law will be extended to the whole territory of the coun-
try” (Koha Ditore, March 12)
Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi told Voice of America radio that the north will 
not be a haven for smugglers and the rule of law will be extended throughout 
the country. “Integration is the only road, the future of Mitrovica is the future 
of Kosovo, there will not be a place for the smugglers that are still operating in 
Mitrovica,” he was quoted as saying.
In the following example, Koha Ditore reports the words of President Sejdiu, 
who uses extreme verbs, such as “inseminate” and “induce” and nouns such 
as “violence”, “anarchy”, “chaotic state” and “political and economic crime” 
to paint an extremely negative image of northern Kosovo Serbs:
“Sejdiu: Mitrovica and the northern part are facing structures that 
inseminate crime” (Koha Ditore, March 25)
Sejdiu expressed his concern that even ten years after those events, Mitrovica 
and northern Kosovo, are facing structures that inseminate political and eco-
nomic crime in order to keep this part of the country in a chaotic state. “Those 
who induce violence and anarchy will not stop us from this journey, as they did 
not manage to eliminate us ten years ago,” he said. 
The statement of President Sejdiu, as reported here, directly accuses the 
Serbs of trying to “eliminate” the Kosovo Albanians ten years ago, which is 
part of the following topic, concerning war crimes and human rights viola-
tions. 
The Threat to Security Frame 3: War crimes and human rights violations
While the articles in this topic are mostly related to crimes committed be-
fore or during 1999, although not exclusively, they are important for the 
present image of the Serb minority, because they serve to reiterate and con-
firm the link between the Serbs and extreme aggression; such articles are 
a constant reminder of Serbs as enemies. Media-monitoring reports also 
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note that the war is still present in the print media, with an emphasis on 
commemorations, witness testimonies and missing persons, but focusing 
exclusively on Albanians, while ignoring facts about the sufferings of people 
from other ethnic groups.64 The articles tend to bring back war-like reac-
tion, using inflammatory wartime rhetoric in describing alleged “Serbian 
crimes”, “Serbian terrorism” and similar issues. The Albanian media con-
stantly remind the public about Serb war crimes and atrocities, focusing 
on the Serbs as exclusive culprits for the war, particularly during periods of 
remembrance and anniversaries of massacres and the NATO bombings.65 In 
many of the articles analyzed there is an emphasis on the responsibility of 
the Serbs in committing “genocide” in Kosovo, wherein the claim is treated 
as a well-established and indisputable fact. 
“Sejdiu: Mitrovica and the northern part are facing structures that 
inseminate crime” (Koha Ditore, March 25)
Speaking in memory of the two martyrs killed that day by Serb forces, Sejdiu 
said that unfortunately no political leader in Serbia, not even those that assess 
themselves as democrats and pro-westerners, have had the courage to apologize 
to Kosovo’s population about the open genocide. 
The words “genocide” and “Holocaust” appear frequently in the Albanian 
articles analyzed:
“The air strikes stopped the Serb genocide” (Bota Sot, March 25)
“Thaçi: Years 1998–99 resembled a new Holocaust” (Koha Ditore, March 25)
This is a common and rhetorically effective strategy for creating authori-
tative victim narratives66 and clearly delineating between victims, i.e. Al-
banians, and villains, i.e. Serbs;67 it is very functional, because, as Doerr 
explains, the “genocide provides metaphorical language and a framework to 
express absolute domination, victimization, and unbearable suffering” (Do-
err 2000).
In the articles analyzed there is often an emphasis on the “planned”, 
“organized”, and “systematic” character of Serb war crimes:
“Sejdiu: Albanians were systematic victims of the Serb state” (Lajm, 
March 31)
64 Youth Initiative for Human Rights 2006, 2005; OSCE, July 2006.
65 Youth Initiative for Human Rights 2006, 2005.
66 See e.g. Schiffrin 2002.
67 It is by no means unique, since, as Moeller (2001) suggests, various groups use the 
Jewish experience to construct their own victim identities.
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Further, the responsibility for war crimes is placed not only on the Serbian 
political elite of the 1990s, but also Serbian state representatives preceding 
and succeeding Milošević:
“Two decades of Serb crimes in Kosovo” (Bota Sot, March 10)
“Sejdiu: Serb massacres of Albanians were planned” (Koha Ditore, March 
31)
President Fatmir Sejdiu met with survivors of Bogujevc, Duriq and Llugali mas-
sacres at his residence yesterday. Sejdiu said that Slobodan Milosevic is not the 
only one responsible for the crimes committed against Albanians. “Tragedies 
faced by these families, as well as many other families in Kosovo, prove that Serb 
violence toward Albanian civilians was not only done by Milosevic’s regime, 
but was planned for a long time and was committed in an organized systematic 
manner by the Serbian state,” he said. 
The significance of articles such as this one is that they remind the public 
of the war crimes committed during the conflict, reaffirming the victim 
identity of the Kosovo Albanians and continually strengthening the image 
of Serbs as “the enemy,” thus making reconciliation efforts quite difficult. 
Further, such statements and articles make claims about the long-term, sys-
tematic, and organized policy of crimes against Kosovo Albanians, present-
ing the conflict as historical and perpetual, but ignoring the whole historical 
context regarding shifting power realities and choosing facts selectivly. The 
implication is that the conflict is fuelled by the hatred that Serbs and the 
Serbian state have for Kosovo Albanians and the consequent destructive 
policies. Here, the master narrative of Threat implies a threat to the very 
existence of the Kosovo Albanian population, and the Threat to Security 
frame is amplified into a threat to survival. Several articles report state-
ments by Kosovo Albanian politicians who emphasize precisely this point, 
and portray the conflict as a struggle for survival and “existence”: 
“The President and the Government deny media reports on KLA 
abuse camps” (Koha Ditore, April 11)
… President Fatmir Sejdiu said the KLA’s fight was righteous and was a fight 
for the existence of Albanians… 
The implication is that the goal of the Serbs is to eliminate the Albanians. 
This adds another dimension to the conflict – of perpetual and inherent 
hatred and opposition. 
In such and similar articles, which present only the Kosovo Albanian 
view, the Kosovo Serb minority is either not included, or their viewpoint 
is ridiculed and portrayed as “propaganda”. Similarly, accusations against 
Kosovo Albanians of committing war crimes are labelled as “propaganda”:
“The President and the Government deny media reports on KLA 
abuse camps” (Koha Ditore, April 11)
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While commemorations of significant nation-building events and their 
coverage in the media are an important aspect of national identity and 
cohesion, the articles that report on commemorations and quote Kosovo 
government officials do not serve to further reconciliation efforts or create 
cohesion between all of Kosovo’s communities, but rather to deepen the 
victim-villain dichotomy, strengthen the negative image of the Serbs as per-
petrators, and reaffirm the Kosovo Albanian understanding of the conflict 
as the Truth. They are instrumental in strengthening negative stereotypes, 
polarized identities and perpetuating the conflict.
Rhetorical devices — compare and contrast, hyperboles and euphemisms
Another instrumental polarization strategy includes rhetorical devices, such 
as contrasts and comparisons, and hyperboles and euphemisms; according 
to Van Dijk (2000) these rhetorical devices are especially powerful and ef-
fective, because they provide intense connotations, and accentuate positive 
information while mitigating negative information about the in-group.
Compare and contrast
Comparison and contrast as rhetorical, as well as mental, features are pri-
mary and indispensable in constructing one’s ethnic identity, particularly in 
situations of conflict; hence, this rhetorical device is present throughout dis-
course. Further, as Savarese (2000) notes, press coverage tends to be based 
on dichotomous frameworks, which emphasize opposites and construct 
contrasting categories, such hero/anti-hero, friend/enemy, etc.:
“Albanians work, Serbs protest” (Lajm, May 6)
“Serbs of Mitrovica protest” (Express, May 22)
Over 100 Serbs in the northern part of Mitrovica did the opposite of what the 
Albanians in Pristina did for the US Vice President, Joseph Biden. The Serbs in 
Mitrovica gathered to protest against his visit in Kosovo, while evaluating his 
state, America, as “the biggest enemy of Serbs and Serbia.” 
Because of identity dynamics in intractable conflict, it is not necessary for 
the Albanian-language newspapers to directly state the contrast, because the 
contrast is already, and always, implied. As Hall  (1985) notes, “positively 
marked terms ‘signify’ because of their position in relation to what is absent, 
unmarked, the unspoken, the unsayable. Meaning is relational within an 
ideological system of presences and absences.” The contrast is between ag-
gressive and peaceful behaviour, and between attack and defence: 
“Ready for peace, but also for defence” (Kosova Sot, March 27)
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The blame for the conflict is directly attributed to the Serbs, who are por-
trayed as having “induced” the “war”, and as being ready and willing to do 
so again. 
The profound contrast between the Serbs and the Albanians is also 
mirrored in representations of leaders and institutions. As we have seen, the 
Serb institutions operating in enclaves are called “parallel structures” and 
are associated with “illegitimacy”, “illegality” and even “terrorism”, while 
the leaders of the Serb government are portrayed as “manipulating”, and 
“threatening”. 
For example, in the following excerpt, Serbia and its institutions, both 
past and present, are negatively evaluated as “not [having] a feeling of com-
passion to solve [missing persons] issues” and as thus limiting the Kosovo 
institutions.68 On the other hand, Kosovo Albanian leaders are presented 
as cooperative, extending a hand of peace toward the Serbs, encouraging 
integration and coexistence.
Hyperboles and euphemisms
Hyperboles are used to emphasize information that is positive for the 
Kosovo Albanians, and negative for the Serbs, while euphemisms are used 
for information that is negative for the Kosovo Albanians and positive for 
the Serbs. The master narrative of Serbs as Threat is based on hyperboliz-
ing the negative stereotypes and the perceived difference between the two 
groups involved; the use of hyperboles is a consequence of the perceived 
immense distance and difference, as well as the very polarized, black-and-
white view that predominates, precluding any middle ground or ambiguity 
(Dujzings 2000). As Savarese (2000) points out, the press frequently uses 
these rhetorical devices to “dramatize” events. 
Thus, in the analyzed articles of the Kosovo Albanian press, and as 
seen in the above-cited examples, the Serbs are always linked with extreme-
ly negative characterizations, such as “uncooperative”, “manipulative”, “ag-
gressive”, “extremist”, and even “terrorist”, while the crimes committed by 
the Serbs are termed “genocide” and even “Holocaust”. 
Hyperboles that accentuate positive characteristics of the Kosovo Al-
banians are particularly frequent in articles concerning the Kosovo Libera-
tion Army (KLA) and its leaders, against the Serbs. In the following example, 
the battle of Adem Jashari, the “Legendary Commander” of the Albanian 
KLA guerrilla and the first and most celebrated “martyr for the nation” (Di 
Lellio & Schwandner-Sievers 2006), against the Serbs, is termed “heroic” 
and a “sublime sacrifice for the Albanian nation”:
68 “Lack of humanity in Serbia” (Express, April 28).
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“Traditional “KLA epopee” manifestation has started” (Koha Ditore, 
March 6)
“The legendary commander and the Jasharis, as well as others, have been a 
unique example of sacrifice and strong resistance of Albanians for freedom and 
independence,” said Kosovo President Fatmir Sejdiu. Prime Minister Hashim 
Thaçi said that their sacrifice was sublime for the Albanian nation. “Today is 
the great day, a day of remembrance of pride for all of us. The sacrifice of Com-
mander Adem Jashari and all other Jasharis was a message for unification, sac-
rifice, freedom, democratic order and for the independent, sovereign state of 
Kosovo,” said Thaçi.
The events in the village of Prekaze in March 1998 are glorified and hyper-
bolized as being a “message for unification, sacrifice, freedom, democratic 
order and for the independent, sovereign state of Kosovo.” 69 Through im-
plicit and explicit contrast the armed struggle against the enemy, i.e. the 
Serbs, is cast as the ultimate patriotic deed. In a society, already extremely 
polarized, segregated, and always ripe with inter-ethnic tensions, this kind 
of rhetoric serves to solidify opposition, even hatred toward the Other, and 
legitimize violence.
On the other hand, euphemisms are used for violence against Kosovo 
Serbs. A case in point is the reporting about the anniversary of the March 
2004 anti-Serb pogrom:70
69 In March 1998 the Serbian police forces surrounded the Jashari family compound in 
the village of Prekaze, in the Drenica valley, and after Adem Jashari, one of the leaders 
of the Albanian guerrilla (KLA), responsible for frequent killings of Serbian officials 
and civilians, refused to surrender and let the civilians leave the compound, Jashari  was 
killed and most of his family, including women and children, were killed. See Judah 
2000. Adem Jashari became the most prominent “martyr for the nation” or “martyr for 
freedom”; subsequently, each victim from the ranks of the KLA became a martyr, and 
is commemorated as such. In Kosovo Adem Jashari, considered by the Kosovo Serbs 
as a brutal anti-Serb terrorist leader, became the most commemorated Albanian com-
mander, as there are many streets, buildings, schools, public institutions, and monu-
ments dedicated to him in Albanian-dominated Kosovo.
70 During the Albanian-organized anti-Serb riots, which erupted on March 17, and 
lasted until March 18, 2004 in at least 33 places around Kosovo and involved around 
51,000 people, 19 persons were killed, while 954 were wounded, including more than 
120 UNMIK police officers and KFOR soldiers that confronted Albanian extremists, 
as well as 58 KPS officers. The violence left 4,100 persons in Serb-inhabited areas dis-
placed, mostly Serbs, Roma and Ashkali, but also dozens of Albanians from Northern 
Mitrovica. The Albanian rioters burned and destroyed 550 homes, along with 27 Serb 
Orthodox churches and monasteries, including UNESCO protected the medieval Serb 
cathedral church of the Mother of God of Ljeviška in Prizren, dating from 1307. An 
additional 182 homes and two other Serb Orthodox churches or monasteries were se-
riously damaged. The March pogrom in 2004 is considered the most serious setback 
since 1999 in creating a multiethnic Kosovo with democratic institutions, where hu-
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“The March 2004 events will not be repeated, says Government” 
(Koha Ditore, March 18)
On the fifth anniversary of the March 2004 events the Government of Kosovo 
committed itself to ensuring that such acts are never repeated. In a press release 
issued yesterday, the government repeated its solidarity with all of those who 
were affected during those unfortunate events.
The March anti-Serb riots, turned into pogrom, are termed “events”71 and 
“unfortunate events,” while the severe violence that was perpetrated is called 
“such acts,” without explicit mention of what exactly happened or any quali-
fication of it; the victims, and the perpetrators, are also not named. Further, 
in the articles analyzed, the Serb views and interpretations of the March 
2004 riots, often characterized in the Serbian press with strong words, such 
as “pogrom”,72 is labelled as “propaganda”:
“Serbs captives of their propaganda” (Lajm, March 18)
Here both hyperbole and euphemism are present as rhetorical devices, since 
the riots are referred to euphemistically as “events” while the Serbs are pre-
sented as “captives” of the memory. Thus, the rhetorical devices work to mit-
igate the severity of the violence committed against the Serbian minority 
during that time, and to avoid invoking responsibility and accountability. 
Lexicalization
Lexicalization, or the language used to emphasize positive information 
about the in-group and negative information about the out-group, is essen-
tial in perceiving the Other, and thus the conflict, in negative and determin-
istic ways (Van Dijk 2000). The language used to describe Serbs reinforces 
the master narrative of Serbs as Threat, within the two frames, the Threat to 
State and Threat to Security. As we have seen in the previous sections, the 
man and minority rights are respected. See Human Rights Watch 2004; International 
Crisis Group 2004; Amnesty International 2004; Kosovo and Metohija 2004; Bataković 
2007b.
71 Zëri (March 18): “Government commits that events of 2004 never be repeated;” Ko-
sova Sot (March 18): “The events of March 2004, one dark episode.” In this article, it is 
interesting to note that the March 2004 riots and anti-Serb pogrom are consider the 
only “dark episode” in the post-1999 history of Kosovo.
72 See e.g., Beta (March 17): “Bogdanović: March Pogrom the biggest failure of the in-
ternational community”; RTS (March 17): “Serbian Orthodox Church: March pogrom 
was continuation of bombing”; Tanjug (March 17): “[Russian] Patriarch Kiril: Wounds 
of March pogrom in Kosovo have not healed”, and “OSCE presents documentary film 
on pogrom of Serbs”; Tanjug (March 18): “Jeremić: March violence was pogrom of 
civilians”, and “Fifth anniversary of violence of Albanians against Serbs in Kosovo”.
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Serb population is negatively associated with extreme and disturbing words 
such as “genocide,” “Holocaust”, “war”, “murder”, and “massacre”:
“Serb genocide” (Infopress, April 28)
“PD: Tadić’s statement – an undeclared war with Kosovo” (Koha Ditore, 
April 20)
The Party of Justice said on Sunday that Serbian President Boris Tadic’s state-
ment in Decan [the Serbian monastery of Visoki Dečani] on Sunday triggered 
bitter feelings among the population of Kosovo. The statement comes on the 
10th anniversary of the murder and massacre of thousands of Albanians, crimes 
for which the Serbian state has never apologized. PD leader Ferid Agani told 
a press conference that Tadic’s visit implies that the war between Kosovo and 
Serbia has not ended, but now continues in a different form. 
“violence”:
“Violence against blackout” (Express, May 12)
“insecurity”:
“Krasniqi: Serbia is exporting insecurity to Kosovo” (Kosova Sot, March 20)
deceitfulness:
“Matoshi: Don’t trust them dear [US vice-president Joseph] Biden” 
(Koha Ditore, May 20)
“danger”:
“Danger from Mitrovica” (Express, April 22)
“force”:
“Serbs try to prevent by force construction process in ‘Kroi i Vitakut’ 
(Infopress, April 28)
“radical” attitudes:
“The ultimatum of the radical Mihajlovic” (Koha Ditore, May 4)
“extremist” behaviour:
“EULEX as UNMIK, embraces the Serb extremists” (Bota Sot, March 3)
“Serb extremists fire weapons” (Bota Sot, March 24)
and “terrorism”:
“10 years for unrestrained non-human from a terrorist state” (Bota Sot, 
April 25)
Belgrade is accused of “manipulating” Serbs in Kosovo:
“Belgrade continues to manipulate Serbs” (InfoPress, May 11)
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having “destructive policies”:
“Thaçi against destructive policies of Serbia” (Lajm, May 15) 
and being “guilty” and “responsible” for various problems:
“Krasniqi: Belgrade is guilty” (Epoka e Re, March 11)
“animosity”:
“Kosovo-Serbia: animosity continues” (Kosova Sot, May 15)
“battle”:
“Kosovo wins the battle of IMF” (Koha Ditore, May 5)
After a long battle, Kosovo triumphed against Serbia’s lobbying campaign 
against a blockage of the voting process of Kosovo membership in IMF.
The word “against” appears frequently in the articles analyzed — Serbs 
against Kosovo Albanians (as in the case of war crimes), the Kosovo (against 
its independence and progress), democratic institutions (not paying electric-
ity bills and not participating in institutions and elections), order (protest-
ing), as well as humanitarian values (reconstruction of Albanian houses):
“Sejdiu: Serbs are against human rights” (Bota Sot, April 25)
The Serbs are associated with opposition: 
“Albanians announce rebuilding, Serbs blockade” (Lajm, April 23)
and “refusal”:
“Teki Dervishi: Serb refusal, Albanian loyalty” (Bota Sot, April 2) 
Yet another aspect of lexicalization are labels that denote ethnicity, which 
are “of primary potency” (Singh 1999) and are thus salient and powerful, 
preventing alternative classification. The labels applied to the Serbs are not 
only stereotypes, reflecting strong prejudices, but have come to be seen as 
integral characteristics of the population itself – they have become cultural 
models (Gee 1996). The very word “Serb” carries extremely negative associ-
ations and evaluations, and is distinguished clearly, in the articles analyzed, 
from “Kosovo”, “Kosovar” and “Albanian”. Also in the examples above, we 
have seen that the label “Serb” is applied in general to the entire Serb popu-
lation, in Kosovo and Serbia, and is used also to refer to Serbian govern-
ment officials; thus, policies of the Serbian government are interpreted as 
“Serb” and negative characteristics attributed to the entire population.
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conflicT dynaMics and iMplicaTions for reconciliaTion
The analysis in the previous section demonstrates several important find-
ings and confirms Wolfsfeld’s (1997) above-indicated four major charac-
teristics of media coverage of minorities. Even though there are significant 
differences between newspapers in reporting about local politics, there is 
consensus and coherence on reporting about Serb-related issues in the three 
months analyzed, and a lack of divergent perspectives and voices. In other 
words, nationalism cuts across party lines.
Negative portrayals and extreme polarization
During the months analyzed a rather notable is an absence of positive 
information about the Serb community, and a lack of positive portrayals 
thereof; the image that is created, on various levels of text and through di-
verse discursive strategies, is entirely negative. The master narrative of Serbs 
as a Threat is reinforced through two main frames — the Threat to State 
and the Threat to Security frame. Within these frames, the topic selection, 
conforming to Van Dijk’s “ideological square” of positive self-presentation 
and negative other-presentation, is characterized by an emphasis on nega-
tive information on, and portrayals of, the Serbs. 
Through rhetorical devices — compare and contrast, and hyperbo-
les and euphemisms — the difference, opposition and extreme polarization 
between the Kosovo Albanians and Serbs is stressed and amplified, while 
through lexicalization the Serbs are presented in stereotypically negative 
ways, as dangerous, antagonistic, aggressive and inhumane. This is congru-
ent with the findings of media monitoring reports, which stress that there is 
a disproportionate emphasis on “radical elements” within the Serb commu-
nity,73 which can “create panic within the majority of Kosovo’s population 
and increase their mistrust towards the Serbian minority”.74
The emphasis is on ethnic belonging and ethnic identity as prima-
ry; all articles analyzed accentuate that as the defining feature. Even when 
problems affect all citizens, or are common Kosovo-wide issues, the context 
is “ethnicized”, and presented as a “Serb issue”, as in the case of electricity 
73 According to media monitoring reports the Albanian media often use inappropriate, 
derogatory and inflammatory language in relation to the incidents caused by the Serb 
community, or issues related to problems facing the Serb community; sometimes such 
language can be considered hate speech; several media outlets are known for the use 
language that incites ethnic hatred, particularly the dailies Bota Sot and Epoka e Re. See 
Youth Initiative for Human Rights 2006.
74 OSCE, July 2006.
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debts. Through labels of primary potency, the reporting stays confined by 
ethnic identity. 
The term “Serb” itself carries extremely negative associations and eval-
uations, and is distinguished clearly, in the articles analyzed, from “Kosovo”, 
“Kosovar” and  “Albanian”, which points to the symbolic exclusion of Serbs 
from Kosovo society, and reflects their physical separation and segregation.
Voice and privilege
The exclusion is reflected also in terms of voice, as the Kosovo Serb commu-
nity, for the most part, is not given a voice in the articles analyzed. Mostly 
Serb government officials from Belgrade are quoted as speaking on behalf 
of the Kosovo Serbs, yet their statements are negatively evaluated or dis-
credited as propaganda.75 Furthermore, international representatives and 
organizations are cited as speaking for and about the Serbs.76 Kosovo Al-
banian government officials are most frequently cited in articles concerning 
Serb issues, and their statements serve to reinforce the master narrative of 
Serbs as a major threat. 
In rare instances when Kosovo Serbs are quoted, they either are la-
belled “radical” and “extremist”, and thus discredited, or they are several Serbs 
who participate in Kosovo institutions, or Serbs that criticize the govern-
ment in Belgrade. In the latter two cases, the media do make a distinction 
between the Kosovo Serb community and the Serbian government, and 
give voice to such criticism; this conforms to Van Dijk’s “ideological square” 
in that it highlights negative information about the Other.77 According to 
media monitoring reports,78 Albanian media in general give more attention 
to those politicians and representatives of Kosovo Serbs who are working 
with the Kosovo institutions, and are perceived as being “moderate”; their 
75 The most cited officials of Serbia are President Boris Tadić, Foreign Minister Vuk 
Jeremić, Minister for Kosovo and Metohija Goran Bogdanović and State Secretary for 
Kosovo and Metohija Oliver Ivanović.
76 “Local Serbs soften their position vis-à-vis Ahttisaari Package” (Koha Ditore, March 
14).
77 “Dejan Jankovic: I report only to the Kosovo police” (Koha Ditore, March 20).
While official Belgrade has stated that the Deputy Director of the Kosovo Police Dejan 
Jankovic will only receive orders and report to EULEX and UNMIK, Jankovic himself, 
via a phone conversation, said that he takes order and reports only to the Director of the 
Kosovo Police. Jankovic on Friday denied Belgrade statements. “I work for the Kosovo 
Police and take orders and report to the Director of the Kosovo Police,” said Jankovic 
for Koha Ditore.
78 OSCE, July 2006; Youth Initiative for Human Rights 2006.
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purpose is to strengthen the impression that progress is being made toward 
the integration of the Serb community.
However, articles citing Serbs who are not Kosovo or Serb govern-
ment officials or political figures, but Kosovo Serb community representa-
tives or citizens are rare during the three month period analyzed.79 There is a 
profound absence of “everyday” voices of Serbs living in Kosovo, and it is the 
various “officials”, whether Serbian, Albanian or international, who speak 
on their behalf. There is also differential treatment of the different voices, as 
the perspectives of Kosovo Albanian officials tend to be privileged.
This points to a further problem revealed in the analysis of articles 
during the three month period, related to “significant silences”. 
Significant silences
As Huckin (2002) demonstrates, “significant silences” or “manipulative si-
lences” deliberately conceal relevant information. The defining characteris-
tics of such silences are intentionality and advantage — certain subjects are 
intentionally omitted in a way that is advantageous to the writer/speaker 
through topic selection and framing. In Van Dijk’s “ideological square” si-
lences refer to information that is negative for the in-group and positive for 
the out-group. 
In the analysis above, there is silence about issues that portray the 
Serbs in a positive light; stories that would contribute to a better under-
standing of the living conditions of the Serb minority in Kosovo are ab-
sent. There is also no coverage of discriminatory practices against the Serb 
minority and the problems they face in trying to remain in Kosovo. A case 
in point is the portrayal of the “parallel structures” which are mystified and 
demonized, without explanations as to the reasons for their existence and 
functions.
Silences are also pronounced in relation to violence committed 
against Serbs, as in the case of the anniversary of the March 2004 riots. This 
conforms to OSCE’s finding that Kosovar Albanian media have shown 
tendencies to downplay stories when Serbs have been victims of possible 
ethnically-motivated crimes.80 
79 This conforms to findings cited in media monitoring reports, which stress that there 
is silence when it comes to providing reports about the everyday life of minorities, 
reflecting their living conditions, opportunities and perspectives, and ordinary citizens 
and members of the community are rarely cited. See Youth Initiative for Human Rights 
2006; Youth Initiative for Human Rights 2005; OSCE, July 2006.
80 OSCE, July 2006.
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Reproducing dominant ideologies
The issues of voice and representation reveal a general problem related to 
Albanian-language print (and other) media that organizations and analysts 
working in Kosovo have noted as concerning;81 namely, the media, for the 
most part, simply reproduce official discourse, citing government officials 
and politicians — Albanian, Serbian and international, reporting their 
statements as facts, without providing context, counterarguments, doing in-
vestigative work or debating issues.82 The discourse further strengthens the 
conflict dynamics of opposition, polarization and even hatred. As Wolfsfeld 
has shown, this is a common feature of media discourse in divided societ-
ies, particularly when there are no shared media outlets; in such instances 
further polarization is almost inevitable. 
Consequences of media discourse and the master narrative of Serbs as Threat 
There are several major implications of the media discourse that centres 
on the master narrative of Serbs as Threat. Not only does the master nar-
rative preclude counter-narratives, or alternative voices, but represses cir-
cumstances and explanations that highlight the imbalance in power rela-
tions. By emphasizing that Serbs are a threat, the Albanians are presented 
as having to constantly defend their territory, state, institutions, their very 
identity and indeed their survival. When the Other is presented as danger-
ous and threatening, fear of the Other and a desire to eliminate the threat, 
physically and symbolically, become perceived as a “natural” response, and 
thus constitute a significant conflict-sustaining dynamic. When the Other 
is perceived as the enemy, then defence against that Other becomes not just 
acceptable, but necessary. Media content that creates fear, such as a focus on 
past atrocities and the history of ethnic hatred, as exemplified in the articles 
analyzed, creates the foundation for violent action, labelled as “self-defence” 
(Frohardt & Temin 2003). 
Other means of eliminating the perceived threat can be hindering 
the return process through institutional blocks and red-tape, impeding in-
tegration and maintaining segregation through the perpetuation of negative 
stereotypes and images and a perpetually hostile environment. One of the 
most common arguments, as we have seen also in the above-cited articles, 
that Kosovo Albanians, and also many international actors, claim is that 
81 USAID 2004.
82 It is interesting to note that while discourse concerning internal politics is vastly 
divergent in the newspapers examined, as all of them are owned and supported by dif-
ferent political parties, the analysis shows that the discourse regarding the Serbian mi-
nority converges and is strikingly uniform. 
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Serbs are not willing to integrate into Kosovo society, and that their isola-
tion is self-imposed.83 Thus, while the problem of the integration of the 
remaining Kosovo Serbs in Kosovo (roughly 200,000 Kosovo Serbs are still 
displaced in central Serbia) is much more complex, the issue is misrepre-
sented and the Serbs are blamed entirely for their predicament; meanwhile 
the Kosovo Albanian leadership and the dominant Albanian community 
are relieved of all responsibility. 
It can be argued that the negative Serb identity is a symbolic mani-
festation of the desire to eliminate the perceived Threat; such an identi-
ty serves to sustain an atmosphere of hostility toward the Serbs, and an 
environment where Serbs do not feel safe or even part of Kosovo society. 
As we have seen in the analysis above, the terms “Serbs” and “Kosovo” are 
juxtaposed, presented as dichotomous, and Serbs are portrayed purely as a 
problem for Kosovo society. Such representations reinforce societal, as well 
as symbolic, exclusion. As Said has shown, misconceptions of the Other 
extend beyond representations, serving to justify dominance of one group 
over another (Said 1978). When discourse that constructs a stigmatized 
Other, through representational practices demonstrated above, and that 
causes violence, either cultural, structural or direct, goes uncontested, and 
defamation and stigmatizing practices are reproduced, they contribute to 
maintaining the systems of domination and subordination. Various human 
rights reports consistently point to “societal antipathy against Serbs and the 
Serbian Orthodox Church”, “societal violence, abuse, and discrimination” 
against the Serb minority, “cases of politically and ethnically motivated vio-
lence” against Serbs and “lack of progress in returning internally displaced 
persons to their homes.”84
The predicament of the Serb minority in Kosovo stems from system-
atic discrimination, which has been institutionalized on different levels in 
favour of Kosovo Albanians,85 and the existence of profoundly different at-
83 According to UNDP’s Early Warning Report, Kosovo Albanians see the influence of 
Belgrade and the lack of readiness of Kosovo Serbs to be integrated into Kosovo society 
as the two most significant factors that continue to affect interethnic relations. Mean-
while, for Kosovo Serbs the two major factors aggravating interethnic relations are the 
attitude of Kosovo Albanian leaders and insufficient efforts to integration the Serbs into 
Kosovo society. See UNDP 2009.
84 U.S. Department of State, February 2009.
85 It can be argued that the predicament of the Serb community is induced by the 
state structure itself. According to Gurr (1993), the majority of states are multi-ethnic. 
However, there are differences between liberal-democratic multi-ethnic states, where 
belonging is based on citizenship, and ethnic states, where it is based on ethnic affilia-
tion and belonging to the dominant ethnic group. The ethnic state is the homeland of 
only one of the multiple ethnic groups and serves the national goals of only one ethnic 
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titudes between Serbs, rejectin Albanian Kosovo statehood  and Albanians 
toward the symbols and values of the state, and the ethnic conflict itself. 86 A 
sweeping and significant gap exists between the Serb and Albanian publics, 
as well as leadership, in understanding the conflict, its causes, the course of 
its development, and significantly, the desirable status solution. Serbs and 
Albanians are fundamentally divided on issues of historical rights, narra-
tives of conflict, assigning blame for the conflict, and its solutions. 
The discriminatory policies against the Kosovo Serbs are grounded 
in the support of the Kosovo Albanian population, and are a lived, daily 
experience. The rationale for these discriminatory policies and for their sup-
port among the Kosovo Albanian public can be found in part in media 
representations. 
The analysis of the newspaper articles in the Albanian media during 
the three month period points to the conclusion that the professed goals of 
multi-ethnicity and equality for all citizens is simply being paid lip service, 
while there is a lack of genuine commitment to reconciliation and the peace 
process.87 
As media are an integral part of society, and as they cannot single-
handedly enact or influence change, serious and long-term change will only 
be possible if the Serbs living in Kosovo are considered truly equal citizens, 
with the right to life, freedom, and equality. 
group to the exclusion of the other ethno-national groups, regardless of their citizen-
ship status. In such a state, the state itself sides with one ethnic group in determining 
tangible and intangible resources, such as political power, wealth and identity, and state 
symbols represent the dominant group. See Maynes 1993; Rouhana 1997. 
86 On the level of state character and symbols, the Kosovo identity is not available to 
the Serb community, because its meaning is intertwined with the Albanianness of the 
state, and because there is an emphasis on the profound difference, and irreconcilable 
contrast, between Kosovar [i.e. Albanian] and Serb. This leaves the Serbs in Kosovo 
in an ambiguous situation – while they claim Kosovo as their homeland, the current 
socio-political and cultural set up of the Albanian-dominated Kosovo impedes, indeed 
precludes, integration, and favours their exclusion. 
87 As Wolfsfeld (2004) shows, when government and elite groups reduce the obstacles 
blocking a minority’s integration into the social mainstream, the change in the political 
environment will also be reflected in news coverage. Otherwise, when the ruling social 
forces inhibit minority integration by placing obstacles in its path, such as discrimina-
tion, denial of its culture, overemphasizing data on crime rates among group mem-
bers, and similar, the negative treatment of minority groups is likely to remain, or even 
grow. 
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